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TELESETSKY

ARTICLE
Insurance as a Mitigation Mechanism:
Managing International Greenhouse Gas
Emissions through Nationwide Mandatory
Climate Change Catastrophe Insurance
ANASTASIA TELESETSKY

*

"The insurance industry must now seize the opportunity to make
a difference not just to the future of our own industry, but to the
future of society."
1
—Lloyds of London
“It is in insurers’ direct interest that government is encouraged to
manage the mitigation of climate-related risks and adapt to
changing climate.”
2
—Pricewaterhouse Cooper
INTRODUCTION
Living at sea level, the Dutch are constructing a climate
defense system, which is the envy of countries such as
Bangladesh that cannot afford the public infrastructure to shore
up its coastline. With current estimates of adaptation ranging
3
from $ 49 billion to $171 billion per year, those States which fail
to climate-proof their cities, may face considerable costs for future
disaster relief and recovery if we fail to adequately mitigate the

*

University of Idaho, Associate Professor
1. 360 Risk Project, Lloyds of London Climate Change, Adapt or Bust 21
(2006).
2. Shamiram Nissan & Jon Williams, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Insurance
Digest, Insurance and Climate Change Challenge 4 (2009), http://www.pwc.com/
gx/en/insurance/insurance-digest-2.html.
3. Department of Economic and Affairs, United Nations, World Economic
Social Survey 2009: Promoting Development, Saving the Planet 155-56 (2009)
(amounts are in U.S. currency).
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quantity of greenhouse gases being emitted. While Africa and
Asia will bear the major brunt of future climate change given the
4
lack of basic disaster prevention in these regions, climate change
disasters are by no means confined to these two continents. As
suggested by the deadly heat waves in Europe and the recent
bushfires in Australia, climate induced disasters strike
indiscriminately. Relative affluence is no guarantee of safety. At
present, current estimates of the increase in humanitarian costs
associated with climate change disaster vary widely from 32%
increase in current costs based on more frequent disaster events
to 1600% based on climate related events that are both more
5
frequent and intense.
What if 104 degree Fahrenheit heatwaves like the one in
6
Europe that claimed 70,000 lives were to become regular events?
There is some evidence that weather related disasters are on the
rise. According to the United States National Climatic Data
Center, this past decade has been the warmest decade in history
with temperatures almost one degree Fahrenheit above previous
7
averages.
According to the report, there have been numerous
weather disaster events that some contend are correlated with
anthropogenic influences on climate change including the
deadliest tornado in Oklahoma history, the largest wildfire in Los
Angeles history, heaviest snowfall in China in fifty-five years, and
8
the deadliest typhoon in Taiwan for five decades.

4. Small Island Developing States in the Pacific and other Lesser Developed
Countries are also especially vulnerable. Guyana may lose up to 19% of its GDP
by 2030 if the floods predicted to accompany climate change materialize. See
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION WORKING GROUP, SHAPING CLIMATE
RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 39 (2009).
5. MACKINNON WEBSTER ET AL., FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, THE
HUMANITARIAN COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2008).
6. Press Release, European Union, Climate Change: Europe Must Take
Adaptation Measures to Lessen Impacts of Current and Future Warming (June
29, 2007).
7. Randolph E. Schmid, 2000s Warmest Decade on Record, Government
Reports, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://www.press
democrat.com/article/20100119/ARTICLES/100119434; see Press Release, World
Meteorological Organization, 2000-2009, The Warmest Decade (Dec. 8, 2009),
[hereinafter WMO Press Release], available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/media
centre/press_releases/pr_869_en.html.
8. WMO Press Release, supra note 7.
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As our global population increases with greater
concentrations of people in cities especially cities in coastal
locations, extreme weather events become both deadlier and more
expensive.
Billion dollar disasters no longer surprise the
insurance industries.
In 2009, a combination of flooding,
thunderstorms, wildfires, and tornadoes resulted in $9.3 billion
9
dollars of damage. In 2008 with its longer hurricane season,
10
damages from severe weather events amounted to $56.5 billion.
In countries such as the United States (U.S.), private insurance
covers a major portion of casualty and property damages. But not
all damages will be fully covered. Public infrastructure,
government buildings, and public amenities are not insured or
the insurance coverage may be insufficient to cover catastrophic
11
losses.
This paper proposes mandatory climate change catastrophe
insurance as a risk-sharing mechanism to distribute future
climate change disaster relief costs between major greenhouse
gas emitting industries and the government. This article argues
that mandatory catastrophe risk insurance for major greenhouse
gas emitters will deliver necessary financial coverage for future
climate disasters as well as compel timely climate change
mitigation on the part of major emitters. The first part of this
paper offers mandatory climate change catastrophe insurance as
an additional market tool to the existing proposals for emission
trading schemes and carbon taxes. This part begins with a
summary of the costs of responding to a climate change disaster
followed by a description of government involvement in delivering
national disaster relief for natural disasters such as earthquakes
and flooding. The paper concludes that even if governments
ultimately become the insurer of last resort in catastrophic
climate change events, that industries should be held accountable
for having contributed to the disaster through “business as usual”
9. National Climactic Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Billion Dollar U.S. Weather Disasters, http://www.ncdc.noaa.
gov/oa/reports/billionz.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
10. Id.
11. FEMA: The Disaster Process and Disaster Aid Programs,
http://www.fema.gov/hazard/dproc.shtm (last visited Aug. 18, 2010); see also
Stephan Hochrainer and Reinhard Mechler, Assessing Financial and Economic
Vulnerability to Natural Hazards in ASSESSING VULNERABILITY TO GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 185 (Anthony Patt et al. eds., 2009).
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practices. After reviewing government’s existing disaster relief
programs, the paper surveys the insurance industry’s climate
change mitigation efforts. Since there are no ongoing insurance
efforts to connect current corporate actions with future climate
change impacts, this paper proposes that governments adopt
regulations mandating catastrophe risk insurance for major
greenhouse gas emitters. The insurance would serve the goals of
both corrective and distributive justice.
The second part of this article suggests that, in the context
of climate change, mandatory insurance fulfills the equitable
goals of the polluter pays principle by legally allocating
responsibility for climate change to industries. In the context of
future climate change disaster, the polluter pays principle is
primarily an equitable principle for restitution and corrective
justice rather than an economic efficiency tool.
PART ONE:
MANDATORY CLIMATE CHANGE CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE
If communities remain vulnerable to extreme weather events
triggered by climate change, the social and economic costs of
climate disaster will be significant. In a March 2009 meeting on
extreme weather events, experts affiliated with the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observed
that the “frequency, intensity, and length” of certain types of
12
events has increased. The IPCC experts proposed insurance as
a possible approach for addressing disaster management and
13
transferring risk rationally.
This paper argues that new insurance products need to be
offered that have the potential not just to compensate for climate
change losses through effective risk management strategies but
also to provide a needed kick-start for mitigation of emissions.
The next section of this paper describes one possible insurance
product that could provide payments to national, state, and
municipal governments to cover rescue costs, delivery of
12. Vicente Barros et al., Scoping Paper- IPCC Report: Managing the Risks of
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation 2 (Apr.
2009).
13. Id. at 4.
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essentials to disaster victims, losses of public property, and other
specified damages to communities injured by climate
catastrophes.
A.

Costs of Climate Disasters

There are many types of costs associated with disaster and
not all costs are easily monetized. Because the focus of this
article is on insurance and insurance requires monetization of
losses in order to calculate risks, this section will focus
exclusively on summarizing economic cost studies associated with
future climate disasters.
The projected costs for climate change catastrophe damages
range widely depending on the assumptions made by various
studies. Economists consider various factors to be catastrophic
losses for the purpose of calculating climate change damages.
Some of the factors for which catastrophic costs have been
calculated include wildfire damages, damages to crops, damages
to marine resources, salinization of water systems, power
outages, and human health risks including injuries caused by
floods.
The years 2008 and 2009 were studded with weather
anomalies triggering humanitarian crises resulting in emergency
14
relief to more than 211 million people, which for comparison is
about two-thirds of the U.S. population. In Asia, heavy monsoon
rains displaced half a million people in India, Nepal and
15
Pakistan. Flooding and cyclones impacted 1.2 million people in
Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
16
While it was flooding in
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Southern Africa, Syria was experiencing droughts affecting 1
17
million people.
The United Nations concluded that, “the
increased severity and frequency of hazard events-other than

14. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of
the United Nations, 2, delivered to the Economic and Social Council and the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/2009/87, A/64/84 (May 28, 2009) [hereinafter
U.N. Economic and Social Council Report].
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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earthquakes and volcanoes- are more than 90% likely to be a
18
result of climate change.”
In terms of severe weather events, U.S. economist Nordhaus
predicts that at least .08% of the U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) ($10 billion) would be needed to deal with increases in
19
hurricane intensity. British economist Nicholas Stern predicts
that losses from extreme weather could reach 0.5–1% of world
20
GDP by 2050. In particular, disaster planners worry about the
survival of public infrastructure during weather disasters. Using
55 years of Munich Re insurance loss data, members of the IPCC
calculate that the average loss to infrastructure from catastrophic
climate change would be between $21.1 billion and $87.7 billion
21
per year.
If states are unable to adapt to climate change
impacts or mitigate these disasters, damages from severe climate
change induced weather events are estimated to be increasing at
an annual rate of 2-6%, amounting to potential global losses of
22
$850 billion to $1.3 trillion. While there is no consensus among
economists on the actual costs associated with future climate
change catastrophes, the costs will not be negligible.
The historic budgets of national government disaster relief
agencies have not taken into account the predicted increase in
intensity and frequency of severe weather events. For example,
in 2000, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) listed a $320 million annual appropriation to their
disaster fund plus an additional $24 billion of emergency
23
appropriations distributed over the course of 10 years. Over the

18. Id. at 2.
19. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, THE ECONOMICS OF HURRICANES IN THE UNITED
STATES 19 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents
/hurr_083109.pdf.
20. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 149 (2007).
21. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL FLOWS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE, 121, para. 463
(2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_
mechanism/application/pdf/background_paper.pdf.
22. Id. at 124, para. 477.
23. Letter from Stanley J. Czerwinski, Assoc. Dir., Housing and Cmty. Dev.
Issues, Res. Cmty, and Econ. Dev. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office to Hon.
Christopher S. Bond, Chairman, & Hon. Barbara A. Mikulski, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcomm. on Va., HUD, and Indep. Agencies Comm. on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate (Aug. 29, 2000) in U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
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course of fiscal years 2004 through 2008, FEMA spent
24
approximately $16.3 billion on goods and services. If multiple
events such as the 2008 Hurricane Ike were to happen in
25
succession, FEMA will face budget shortfalls if Congress does
not increase FEMA’s budget or allocate additional emergency
appropriations.
Governments are allocating funds to assist with adaptation,
such as the $2.9 billion Dutch budget to rezone flood areas and
26
reposition dikes and the proposed $42 billion set aside by the
27
United Kingdom government to raise the Thames flood barriers.
These funds are earmarked for infrastructure projects to adapt to
gradual climate change impacts, such as sea level rise and not to
respond to costs associated with extreme weather events. As the
next section explains, governments are traditionally the primary
source of funding for disaster relief and many governments may
not be well equipped to handle the financial burden of multiple
climate-induced disasters.
B.

Government’s Traditional Role in Disaster Relief

Historically, national and subnational governments provide
financial relief and compensation when a natural disaster occurs
that damages property and requires human rescue. The central
role of government in disaster relief is in response to private
insurers refusing to cover catastrophic “act of God” damages that

DISASTER RELIEF FUND: FEMA’S ESTIMATES OF FUNDING REQUIREMENTS CAN BE
IMPROVED, GAO/RCED-00-182 at 1 (2000).
24. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FEMA’S DISASTER CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, OIG-1053, at 2 (2010).
25. Hurricane Ike is one of the most costly recent disasters on record with
private losses of $17.6 billion and $2.4 billion in claims under the National Flood
Insurance Program, see HOWARD KUNREUTHER & ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN,
ENCOURAGING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: LONG-TERM FLOOD INSURANCE 2
(2009), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/RFF-IB-09-13.
pdf.
26. David Satterthwaite et al., Adapting to Climate Change in Urban Areas,
International Institute for Environment and Development 89 (Human
Settlements Discussion Paper Series, Theme: Climate Change & Cities No.1
2007), available at http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/10549IIED.pdf.
27. MARCO GRASSO, JUSTICE IN FUNDING ADAPTATION UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 74 (2010).
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are not specifically contemplated during the underwriting of a
given policy.
Since only about 20% of global disaster losses are privately
28
insured, citizens generally depend on their governments as the
ultimate reinsurer for property losses and the provider of
emergency financial relief. Most governments in industrialized
countries are involved in some sort of risk management strategy
as either primary insurers or reinsurers of extraordinary risks.
Depending on the country, coverage may be voluntary or
compulsory. Some of the compensation arrangements are ad hoc,
while others operate through state or quasi-state institutions. In
some States, the party who ultimately pays for the national
disaster compensation schemes will be either citizens who own
property insurance (e.g. France), or the tax-paying population at
large (e.g. U.S.).
In the U.S., disaster relief is delivered primarily by the
Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency
29
Management Agency (FEMA). As a federal government agency,
FEMA’s budget is derived from national taxes. Other States have
implemented different disaster relief management approaches.
In 1982, the French government created a nationwide disaster
30
compensation scheme. It covers earthquakes, floods, landslides,
hailstorms, avalanches, tsunamis, and droughts. All property
damage policies sold by private insurers include compulsory
natural disaster coverage with rates set by the government. The
coverage is triggered when 1) a natural disaster is officially
declared by the government; 2) the damaged property was
protected under the policy; and 3) the claimant proves that the
property was damaged by the natural disaster. After an insuree
meets a mandatory deductible that is calculated by the
government, the insurer pays for material losses as well as
business interruptions. In order to guarantee the solvency of this

28. Reinhard Mechler, Financing Disaster Risks in Developing and Emerging
Economy Countries, in FLORE-ANNE MESSY, POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE
CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE, NO. 8 at 105, 116 (2005).
29. See The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
5121 (1988)).
30. See Law No. 82-600 of July 13, 1982, Journal Officiel de la Republique
Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1992, p. 187.
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system, the government offers natural disaster reinsurance to the
31
property insurers with unlimited coverage.
In Spain, the Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros is a
society-wide compensation scheme for extraordinary risks and
was created in response to the man-made losses during the
32
Spanish Civil War. The organization’s work is grounded on the
principles of solidarity among the insured, compensation for risks
and hazards across different regions, cooperation between the
private market, and the public government, and reliance on
33
public funds as a last resort. It is run as a statewide business
attached to the Ministry of Economy and Finance but has assets
and liabilities that are separate from the state. It pays claims
when an extraordinary risk is not specifically covered by another
insurance policy or the risk is covered but the company cannot
meet its financial obligations. The types of risk that are covered
include floods (except for the flooding of artificial canals), volcanic
eruption, sea surges, earthquakes, storms including windstorms
34
with winds greater than 135 km/h, terrorism, and civil unrest.
To create a sufficient capital reserve, the Consorcio collects
compulsory sums that are levied on all accident and property
insurance policies. The Consorcio puts these partially taxdeductible sums in a stabilization reserve. Historically, the
Consorcio has also temporarily covered risks where there is no
market activity to protect parties, such as the risk of terrorism
and war after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Unlike the
French model described above, compensation from the Consorcio
does not depend on an official declaration of a disaster by the
state. The General Manager of the Consorcio is aware that
climate change will present a challenge to the Consorcio and has
observed that even though the insurance industry is not the
exclusive solution to compensation for climatic events, “it will

31. See generally CCR, http://www.ccr.fr/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). (Caisse
Centrale de Réassurance-website for State-owned reinsurance company that
provides reinsurance coverage for French natural disasters).
32. See generally Ignacio Machetti, The Spanish Experience in the
Management of Extraordinary Risks, Including Terrorism, in FLORE-ANNE
MESSY, POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE, NO. 8
at 337 (2005).
33. Id. at 341.
34. Id. at 342.
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have to offer insurance alternatives according to each climatic
35
reality.”
New Zealand introduced the Earthquake Commission
Natural Disaster Fund in 1993 to cover natural disaster losses for
36
residential properties.
The coverage is compulsory whenever
37
fire insurance is purchased. The premium for natural disaster
coverage is collected by private insurers and then sent to the
Earthquake Commission, a state entity, which administers the
natural disaster insurance, including processing the claims and
38
organizing reinsurance.
As with the French compensation
scheme, the government is the ultimate reinsurer.
In the Netherlands, some government compensation may be
39
The
provided under the Calamities and Compensation Act.
available compensation is limited to those situations in which a
flood results in a disruption of public safety and requires a
coordination of civil services. Damage caused by storm surges is
not covered, because it is considered too difficult to calculate the
40
costs of such events.
Some countries such as Australia use funding mechanisms
created from tax revenue. Through its Natural Disaster Relief
and Recovery Arrangements fund, the federal government
provides post-catastrophe funding to both States and Territories
to cover specific expenses. The fund is intended to supplement
41
private insurance.
In Turkey, a national disaster insurance scheme provides
relief to Turkish households located within municipalities in the

35. Id. at 347.
36. Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Public Act 84, Section 13 (N.Z.),
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0084/latest/DLM305
968.html; see generally EQC, Earthquake Commission, EQC Insurance,
http://www.eqc.govt.nz/insurance.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
37. Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Public Act 84, Section 18 (N.Z.).
38. Id. at Section 5.
39. Alberto Monti, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of LargeScale Disasters, in POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF
LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES, NO. 12 at 82 (2008).
40. W. J. W. Botzen & J. C. J. M. van den Bergh, Insurance Against Climate

Change and Flooding in the Netherlands: Present, Future, and Comparison with
Other Countries, 28 RISK ANALYSIS 413, 416 (2008).
41. See NEIL WEEKS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF CATASTROPHES IN AUSTRALIA
(n.d.), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/33/38120102.pdf.
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42

event of an earthquake. Depending on where a home is located,
how the home is constructed, and what risk-reduction measures
households have taken, the insurer calculates a premium. Every
household is required to pay an insurance premium to a privately
administered, public fund. The World Bank provides another
layer of reinsurance in the form of low-interest loans to cover
losses that occur before there is sufficient capital in the insurance
43
fund to cover them, or where losses are unusually high.
In Japan, a similar earthquake reinsurance program exists
with the Japanese government, rather than the World Bank
serving as the insurer of last resort. With the creation of the
44
Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Company, the public and
private sector share the responsibility of compensating for losses.
When a homeowner purchases insurance for earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis, the private insurance company
carries liability up to 75 billion yen for each earthquake.
Anything above this sum, up to approximately 1 trillion yen ($11
million), is carried 50% by the insurance company and 50% by the
government. Anything above this sum, up to maximum payment
limit per event of 4.5 trillion yen ($50 million), is 95% carried by
the government, and 5% by the insurance industry. This model
provides a critical role for the private sector in loss-management
and prevention up to a certain point, after which the government
becomes the primary risk manager for large losses.
What do all these government sponsored or government run
risk management schemes suggest in the context of climate
change? These schemes all provide primarily public models and
mechanisms for compensating for climate change damages. They
point to a society wide inclination to allow the government or a
quasi-governmental agency to be the primary risk manager for
catastrophic disaster relief. The proliferation of such schemes
42. Monti, supra note 39 at 95-99. (summarizing Turkey’s Insurance Decree
Law).
43. D. Kuzek, K. Campbell & M. Khater, The Use of Probabilistic Risk
Models for Managing Earthquake Insurance Risks: Example for Turkey, in
CATASTROPHE RISK AND REINSURANCE: A COUNTRY RISK MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE, World Bank 41-64 (E. Gurenko ed. 2004).
44. See generally Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan & K.
Kawachimaru, Disaster Risk Management in Japan, in FLORE-ANNE MESSY,
POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE: CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE, NO. 8 at 337
(2005).
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means that the insurance industry is reluctant to underwrite
extraordinary catastrophic risks.
Unlike some of the catastrophes contemplated in the design
of these government disaster relief schemes, climate change
catastrophes, as the General Manager of the Consorcio de
Compensacion de Seguros noted, produce qualitatively different
sorts of risk than earthquakes. Before scientists understood that
ongoing human activities had direct impacts on climate change
risks, there were few or no agents to hold directly responsible for
a given natural disaster. In some cases, builders of shoddy
construction or municipalities who permitted building in
floodplains might be held indirectly responsible for the ultimate
damages suffered. With the anthropogenic connection between
extreme weather events and greenhouse gas emissions, however,
there is now at least a partial chain of responsibility. While it
may be efficient for industry to allow government to shoulder the
expenses of disaster relief, it is no longer equitable for
government to be the primary financier of disaster relief. If the
government remains the loss manager of first resort for a climate
change related disaster, the government absolves the private
sector of its responsibility for contributing to the larger pollution
problem and provides no incentive to change any “business as
45
usual” practices.
What is needed is some regulatory tool to distribute financial
losses in the event of a climate change catastrophe, between the
government who currently shoulders the full burden of
catastrophe relief and industries who will have contributed to the
conditions triggering a disaster without paying for the
consequences of those actions. As explained below, private
mandatory catastrophe risk insurance distributes financial losses
in a catastrophe while satisfying goals of corrective justice
encapsulated in the polluter pays principle.

45. This argument does not suggest that governments with their large fossil
fuel driven bureaucracies and individual citizens with their carbon-intensive
lifestyles are not somehow also responsible for contributing to ongoing climate
change, but entrenched partisan politics in countries such as the U.S. and a lack
of individual continuity regarding environmental values restrain the
government and individuals from either setting stringent emissions targets or
changing consumption patterns in a timely, meaningful fashion to avert further
increases in greenhouse gas concentrations.
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Insurance Industry Response to Climate Change

The insurance and investment industries have been actively
seeking to engage policymakers on climate change adaptation and
46
mitigation issues. In 2008, the insurance industry recognized
climate change as the number one threat to property and casualty
47
insurance markets.
The insurance industry recognizes that
averting long-term catastrophic climate change impacts is
necessary for the growth, profitability and viability of its
industry. After the Copenhagen talks, global reinsurer Munich
Re was quick to comment that an international agreement
reducing greenhouse gases is crucial in light of the $21 billion
loss in 2009 and the $50 billion loss in 2008 for the insurance
48
industry from impacts caused by natural disasters. Of the $80
billion paid by the U.S. insurance industry in 2005, $62 billion of
that was paid for weather-related losses in contrast to $40 billion
dollars of losses in the 1990s and $4 billion dollars of losses in the
49
1950s.
Insurers speculate that large future catastrophes are
likely to be more frequent and/or more damaging as a result of
climate change since the number of severe weather-related
catastrophes has already cost the insurance industry $1.6 trillion
50
dollars since 1980 in claim payments.
Up to now, most of the effort of the insurance industry has
either been in adapting insurance policies to leave them less
exposed to predicted extreme weather events or in providing
products that encourage investors in carbon mitigation services
through financial loss insurance. Concerned about their
46. See, e.g., Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last
visited Aug. 18, 2010); Investor Network on Climate Risk, http://www.incr.com
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010); Munich Re Climate Change and Insurance,
http://www.munichre.com/en/ts/climate_change_and_insurance/default.aspx
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
47. See generally Ernst & Young, Climate Change No. 1 in Top 10 Risks
Facing the Insurance Industry, INSURANCE JOURNAL, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/03/12/88138.htm.
48. Ulrike Dauer, Munich Re: Climate Change Losses Set to Rise; Deal
Needed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052748703510304574625931956804434.html.
49. Paul Gutermann, et al., Storm Clouds Ahead: Climate Change and the
Insurance Industry, in CLIMATE CHANGE: LITIGATION, REGULATION, AND RISK
(Phyllis Skupien & Jodine Mayberry eds., 2008).
50. Gerrit Wiesmann, Munich Re Urges Climate Action, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98a3ac0a-f4e2-11de-9cba-00144feab49a.html.
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overexposure in certain geographical markets to impending
severe weather events, insurers are refusing to renew property
and casualty policies. Insurers in areas perceived to have high
risks from severe weather events such as Cape Cod,
Massachusetts are withdrawing from certain markets because of
growing concerns about undercapitalization for large-scale
51
weather related events.
Responding to the losses associated
with Hurricane Katrina, three of the largest insurers Allstate,
State Farm, and Liberty Mutual substantially reduced future
exposure to Katrina-like events by turning down all new
homeowner insurance requests in New Jersey, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Maryland, Massachusetts and the eight downstate
52
counties of New York.
Insurers are also offering products associated with the
emerging carbon markets. For example AIG is currently offering
Carbon Credit Delivery Insurance to cover costs associated with
investing in a Clean Development Mechanism Project or a Joint
Implementation Project that does not deliver carbon credits
53
because of technical problems or political risk problems. AIG
also intends to offer Renewable Energy Certificate Insurance and
54
Most of these
Forest Carbon Sequestration Insurance.
insurance products simply protect external mitigation efforts
through programs such as the Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation and the Clean Development
Mechanism. These products do not directly stimulate emission
mitigation through changes in existing business practices. The
following section explores an insurance product designed to
stimulate systemic change, share financial responsibility for
future climate change disasters between industries and
governments, and hold industries accountable for greenhouse gas
emitting business practices.

51. Karen Breslau , The Insurance Climate Change: Coastal Homeowners In
The East Are Losing Their Policies Or Watching Premiums Skyrocket. Carriers
Say That Global Warming Is To Blame, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007.
52. Paul Vitello, Home Insurers Canceling in East, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007.
53. AIG American International Group, Inc. Initiatives, http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=76115&p=irolgovresponsinitatives (last visited Aug. 18,
2010).
54. Id.
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D.

Mandatory Private Climate Change Catastrophe
Insurance as a Climate Change Mitigation Strategy

1.

Introduction

Why is mandatory private insurance part of the solution to
stimulating mitigation efforts?
First, as professional risk
managers, the insurance industry is one of the few business
sectors that can catalyze rapid change from other private
business sectors. In fact, some insurance analysts envision a
particularly active role for the industry in addressing the longterm challenges of climate change as suggested by the following
comments in a well-respected insurance industry journal.
[The insurance industry] needs to prepare itself for the
adverse effects that climate change may entail on its
business and on its customers . . . [and] find solutions to
reduce the economic risks linked to climatic evolutions and
possibly to help society to cope with the root that causes
global warning by promoting new technologies that should
55
enhance mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.
Second, the private insurance industry has the market clout to
demand changes since it is the world’s largest industry in terms
of yearly revenues. If the industry were a country, it would be
the world’s third largest country with annual revenues of $3.2
56
trillion a year. Almost 8% of the global GDP comes from
57
insurance premiums.
Insurance works as a climate change mitigation strategy
because insurance companies have the potential to catalyze
fundamental behavioral change among insurees; insurance
companies interested in their bottom line will not insure bad
risks and where they insure highly risky activities they will
demand high premiums to cover their risks. Even though climate

55. Sophie Chemarina & Pierre Picarda, Editorial Insurance and Adaptation
ON RISK AND INSURANCE ISSUES AND
PRACTICE 33, 66–70 (2008).
56. Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE 1040 (2005).
57. Evan Mills, Insurance as an Adaptation Strategy for Extreme Weather
Events in Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, 12 (Lawrence
available
at
Berkeley
Nat’l
Lab.
Report
No.
52220,
2004),
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5609x12n.
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change research is vexed with unknowns, insurance companies
can make some assumptions about future extreme weather
events and construct insurance contracts that equitably pool and
share risks.
Insurance will also work as a mitigation strategy because it
defines in advance the limits of a given risk and then “finds ways
58
to insure what has previously been regarded as uninsurable.” A
few decades ago, no one would have expected the insurance
industry to be able to manage risks such as nuclear energy
production and terrorist events through insurance products. Yet,
the insurance industry has developed products to spread the risk
associated with these open-ended events by defining insurance
parameters. In the case of climate change, insurers can work in
tandem with scientists and climate modelers to identify technical
and economic parameters to define the risks of climate change
59
based on agreed upon measurable triggers. To the extent that it
can set some mutually agreed upon parameters, the industry can
disaggregate the completely speculative risk of climate change
into more discrete risks such as a sharp increase in temperature,
an increase in sea level rise, a decrease in water supply, an
increase in intensity of storm systems, or an increase in number
of wildfires.
Once risks have been identified and quantified and an
adequate number of possible parties needing insurance have been
60
identified to satisfy insurance’s “law of large numbers,” insurers
need to set fair premiums based on the specific risk potential of

58. RICHARD ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK,
INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 18 (2004).
59. P.A. Scott, et al., Human Contribution to the European Heat Wave of
2003, 432 NATURE, 610–14 (2004).
60. This is a probability theorem that explains why insurance policies need to
be system-wide or at least adopted across various risk groups in order for profits
from a given insurance product to be stable. If only a few insurance policies were
issued for a random risk such as an urban flood, then the insurance agency
would have too broad of a deviation of risk to ensure sufficient capital from
premiums to cover losses in the case of a flood resulting from a single clogged
storm sewer. The more policies that are issued, the more stable long-term
results become. Not every insurance policy will be for the neighborhood next to
the clogged storm sewer. If all of the insurance policies are for the same affected
neighborhood, then the law of large numbers no longer works because the risks
are no longer independent of each other.
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61

each party seeking insurance. In the context of climate change,
this means understanding the probability of a given event in
relation to the probability of an insuree’s activities causing a loss.
Proposing that the insurance industry actively manage
climate change risks by requiring insurees to behave in a less
risky fashion is not a radical proposal for the industry. As one
author suggests, the quiet power of insurers over their insured
parties is equivalent to a “material constitution . . . that operates
through routine, mundane transactions that nevertheless define
62
the contours of individual and social responsibility.” In the past,
to reduce exposure to losses, the insurance industry has
frequently mandated system-wide implementation of technologies
that mitigate losses. For example, fire insurers have required
that their insured parties install fire alarms not just to protect
the insures property but also to protect other buildings in the
community whose owners might be able to file a third-party claim
against the insurer. Even where a given technology is not
required, insurance companies offer incentives for adopting
certain technology. For example, preferential auto insurance
rates are given to vehicle owners who drive cars with anti-lock
braking systems and other safety features.
While major industry players have conceded that their
greenhouse gas emissions must be managed, these players want
to be able to set their own schedule for reductions. If the
insurance industry were to become substantially involved in
underwriting the climate change catastrophe risks posed by
certain major emitters, then emitters would find themselves
having to answer to the risk tolerances of insurers rather than
simply the annual profit demands of their boardroom. The
climate risks associated with certain industry behaviors would be
scrutinized and evaluated not only through the public lens of
environmental agencies and environmental activism groups, but
more importantly, through the risk tolerance of private insurers.
As long as insurers seek to responsibly manage their risk
portfolios, any requirement for mandatory insurance from major
61. Howard C. Kunreuther, & Paul K. Freeman, Insurability, Environmental
Risks, and the Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 302, 305
(Anthony Heyes, ed. 2001).
62. T. Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 291
(1996).
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greenhouse gas emitters should gradually reduce national climate
change emissions as insurers demand certain mitigation efforts
on the part of their insurees. If fully implemented, a mandatory
insurance scheme should lead to some combination of direct
mitigation by large greenhouse gas emitters or indirect emission
mitigation as the goods or services of large greenhouse gas
emitters become more expensive and consumers purchase less,
conserve more, or seek less-polluting alternatives.
2.

Earthquake Insurance as a Model for Developing
Climate Change Insurance Products

While scientists are well informed about what happens
during and after an earthquake, the tools to forecast earthquakes
remain underdeveloped. While there are substantial challenges
with obtaining information about when an earthquake will
happen, there are ample models about what losses are likely in
the event of a certain magnitude earthquake. So while insurers
do not know when to expect a given magnitude earthquake, they
can make predictions about how much damage a given magnitude
earthquake would cost. While wary of insuring for earthquakes
because of the uncertainties of timing, private insurers have
offered and continue to offer certain levels of earthquake
insurance. A review of earthquake insurance products may
provide some insights about the role of insurance in climate
change.
Like climate change, the modeling of earthquakes is based on
“dubious assumptions and subjective criteria related to what
63
might happen over the next several hundred years.” What data
does exist on historic earthquakes is limited. Yet private insurers
have not completely shied away from offering insurance products
to cover against long-term geological risks. They have instead
simply relied on more creative and imaginative analytical
techniques, collected more evidence including independent
geological surveys, and then issued policies on the basis of certain
educated assumptions about geological risk.
Insurance companies view earthquakes from the point of
view of not “if” but “when.” With the emphasis placed on “when,”

63. ERICSON & DOYLE, supra note 58, at 34.
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the companies consider their contribution to be one of amassing
capital that will be made available to protect the monetary value
of assets “when” there is a disaster. Where earthquake insurance
is offered as part of property and casualty insurance packages,
some nationwide insurers provide affordable premiums by
packaging the earthquake coverage as a non-negotiable part of
64
the policy regardless of the actual risk of earthquakes.
This
means that property owners in areas where there is no danger of
earthquake subsidize future payouts for earthquake losses.
In order to create somewhat affordable premiums with a
broad enough market for risk pooling, the insurers currently rely
on contributions from both the government and insured parties.
Governments can provide some security and incentive for
insurers who offer earthquake insurance by either reinsuring
certain high-level risk or by offering capital reserve-building tax
benefits to insurers including relief from paying income tax on
65
earthquake insurance premium income.
Like other kinds of insurance for “uninsurable” risks,
earthquake insurance has its own challenges. One of the greatest
challenges is to convince parties to purchase insurance since
earthquakes are improbable risks. The second challenge is to
ensure that insurers are actually setting premiums aside from its
66
general pool into an earthquake reserve pool.
The general
perception in the industry is that earthquakes are distant
dangers that do not require short-term financial planning. The
final challenge is making sure that the reinsurance on
earthquake risks does not result in a “house of cards” effect if one
reinsurer was to collapse because it has assumed too much risk
67
from irresponsible underwriters.
The challenges faced by earthquake insurers are informative
for would-be insurers of climate change. Both events involve a
high magnitude of damages with poor levels of predictability.
While no one knows when or how likely it is that key ice shelves
will melt or Category IV storms will hit the coasts, existing
earthquake insurance schemes suggest that a viable climate

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 191.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
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change insurance scheme may require some form of government
reinsurance or guarantee, may need to be both mandatory and
risk-differentiating to ensure adequate capitalization, and may
require from its insured parties changes in business practices to
reduce risks. Earthquake insurance is mandatory in New
Zealand, Taiwan, Turkey, and Iceland.
3.

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Insurance

One of the keys allowing for proper capitalization for
earthquake insurance is mandatory participation in an insurance
scheme. For a climate change catastrophe insurance product to
serve a meaningful mitigation role, it will need to be mandated
for major greenhouse gas emitters. There are various economic,
political, and scientific approaches to defining a “major”
greenhouse gas emitter. For the purposes of this proposal for
insurance, a major greenhouse gas emitter will be any industrial
plant that emits 25,000 tons of greenhouse gases a year as well as
any industry whose business activities cumulatively contribute
25,000 tons of greenhouse gases a year. This number was chosen
based on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s proposal to
require polluters releasing 25,000 tons of greenhouse gases a year
to implement best available technology whenever an existing
68
facility is changed or a new facility is built.
The most important reason for mandating catastrophe risk
insurance is to compel industry actors to take action under the
supervision of the profit motivated insurance industry.
Industries have understandably taken few steps to mitigate their
emissions since there remains uncertainty about what sort of
carbon market will emerge or what regulatory expectations
companies must meet. In some respects, the current regulatory
paralysis may be encouraging companies to continue “business as
usual” practices in hopes of future benefits under an unknown
trading scheme. Even though some companies have participated
in carbon footprinting through projects such as the Carbon
69
Disclosure Project, coal powered electricity plants continue to go
68. Dina Cappiello, EPA to Crack Down on Greenhouse Gas Emitters, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 1, 2009.
69. Carbon Disclosure Project, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited Aug. 18,
2010).
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on-line in countries such as the U.S. with 77 plants under
70
construction, permitted, or being developed as of January 2010.
Without a regulatory incentive such as mandatory insurance to
change current behavior, history suggests that industries are
unlikely to adopt greener production. Even though climate
change concerns have been debated since the 1990s, it has taken
almost two decades to get research and development financing
into areas such as cleaner emissions in greenhouse gas intensive
71
sectors such as the heavy trucking industry whose overall
72
greenhouse gas emissions have grown 76% since 1990.
There are numerous other practical reasons for mandating
insurance. First, mandating the insurance should provide some
safeguard against insurer insolvency in the face of a catastrophic
disaster. If the product was completely voluntary, the burden
would be on the insurance industry to market the product by
persuading companies that the cost-benefit analysis weigh in
favor of paying an insurance premium now rather than facing the
costs of future unknown liability.
Given the current line of cases seeking liability against
greenhouse gas producers, the industry may be willing to gamble
that plaintiffs will not be able to definitively prove causation
thereby reducing industries exposure to payments for climate
change damages. In the earliest climate change liability cases,
plaintiffs argued that unabated emission of greenhouse gases by
corporations were the equivalent of public nuisances. Trial courts
rejected this line of reasoning because the plaintiffs were seeking
73
resolution of a “political question” by the courts. In a later case
Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, plaintiffs
sued for the costs of relocating their village due to historically
70. Erik Shuster, Tracking New Coal-Fired Power Plants, NATIONAL ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, Jan 8, 2010, http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/
ncp.pdf.
71. Peterbuilt News & Events, Jan. 12, 2010 U.S. Department of Energy
Awards
$39
million
in
Support
of
the
Supertruck
Program,
http://www.peterbilt.com/newsdetails.aspx?id=275 (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
72. U.S. DOT, Transportation & Climate Change Clearinghouse,
Transportation GHG Emissions and Trends: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from
Transportation
and
Mobile
Sources,
by
Vehicle
Type,
http://climate.dot.gov/ghg-inventories-forcasts/national/us-inventory-structure.
html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
73. People v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871,
at *16 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2007).
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unprecedented storm surges created by the early melting of Arctic
ice sheets. Plaintiffs argued that in addition to creating a public
nuisance certain oil companies should be held responsible for
conspiring to cover up the impacts of their activities on climate
and be required to compensate plaintiffs on a market-share
74
basis. Relying on the factors from the seminal political question
75
case Baker v. Carr, the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s case in
Kivalina by finding that the pleadings raised a non-justiciable
political question. Even though the Second Circuit recently
76
decided in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co,. that the
political question doctrine did not bar nuisance claims against
major greenhouse gas emitters, the California District Court
refused to follow suit and commented that, “[t]his court is not so
sanguine. While such principles may provide sufficient guidance
77
in some novel cases, this is not one of them.”
With the future of civil liability so uncertain, industry has no
incentive to change “business as usual” and certainly no incentive
to purchase voluntary climate change insurance. The only
possible incentive to purchase voluntary insurance would be if the
government guaranteed some cap on industries’ exposure to
future liability suits. The failure of civil liability suits to create
any traction to promote greenhouse gas mitigation efforts
suggests a second reason for mandating climate change
catastrophe insurance. No voluntary insurance scheme would
cover in any meaningful fashion the government costs associated
with responding to an extreme weather climate disaster. If there
are only a few companies participating voluntarily in the scheme,
the insurance will be unable to spread the risk across the
population of insured parties and without the law of large
numbers operating, any insurance claims would result at best in
only token payouts.
A final reason for mandating insurance is to establish for the
business community that climate change is a manmade disaster

74. Complaint at 2, Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663
F.Supp2d 863 (N.D. Cal Feb. 26, 2008) (No. 08-01138); Native Vill. Of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp2d 863 (N.D. Cal 2009) (granting the motion to
dismiss the complaint).
75. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
77. Kivalina, 663 F.Supp2d at 875.
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and that the long-term solutions to advert climate change are
human solutions. Legal precedent suggests that even though the
state has traditionally shouldered the costs associated with “act
of God” natural disasters, the community expects private insurers
78
to pay for damages associated with manmade disasters. Even
with the general scientific and policymaking consensus that
climate change has been caused by anthropogenic sources,
corporations continue to introduce technologies that fly in the
face of climate change being any sort of short-term corporate
79
policy concern. When premiums are accurately set, mandatory
insurance is an effective tool for limiting the externalization of
the social and environmental costs of business practices.
Legislating for mandatory insurance products will be
controversial.
It may even be more controversial among
insurance companies than among insurees. Efforts in February
2009 to require insurers to offer a climate change product such as
pay-as-you-drive insurance in order to incentivize driving less
were met with resistance from the insurance industry. David
Snyder, a vice president with the American Insurance
Association, claims that when the legislature creates mandatory
80
policies it puts insurers in a “regulatory straitjacket.”
Yet without mandating a nationwide policy, there will be
neither industry wide changes leading to meaningful reductions
in emissions nor adequate capitalization for any insurance
product protecting against catastrophic climate change damages.
Insurance customers seeking coverage under a voluntary product
78. See, e.g., Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide, International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Nov. 29, 1969) 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970);
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects
of Industrial Accidents, available at http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liability/
documents/protocol_e.pdf.
79. Mike Robinson, Vice President, Environment, Energy, and Safety Policy,
GM (Oct. 29, 2009) (stating in a corporate responsibility blog: “we will take
issues
like
climate
change
head
on”);
but see Cadillac.com,
http://www.cadillac.com/dts/features-specs/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (noting
that GM continues to offer in 2010 its new “full-size” 4000 pound Cadillac DTS
which gets 15 mpg in the city).
80. Evan Lehmann, Regulators Vote to Make Industry Act on Climate
Change, CLIMATEWIRE, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire
/2009/02/25/archive/6?terms=insurance.

23

TELESETSKY

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

714

[Vol. 27

who refuse to make the changes requested by an insurance
company as part of an insurers’ risk assessment would have the
option to simply not insure. Some players in the insurance
industry seem to favor regulation. In testimony before the Select
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, Frank
Nutter of the American Reinsurance Association commented that
the insurance industry is not responsible for “bearing the cost of
climate change without a concomitant commitment on the part of
society to pursue a mitigation strategy—addressing the causes
81
and consequences of climate change.”
Government regulations provide the nationwide commitment
that some players in the insurance markets seem to be waiting
for before acting. A regulatory scheme that requires mandatory
private catastrophe risk insurance makes sense for the federal
and state governments as they seek to adequately capitalize
disaster relief compensation programs and post-disaster
infrastructure revitalization programs. Mandatory insurance
provides governments with a proven market mechanism that can
indirectly manage existing and future risks in a dynamically
changing environmental and business climate.
4.

Logistics of Implementing Private Climate Change
Catastrophe Risk Insurance

The impetus for proposing mandatory climate change
catastrophe insurance to cover the costs generally associated with
government run catastrophic relief is to provide an indirect
incentive for major greenhouse gas emitting corporations to make
systemic greenhouse gas reducing changes in their operations. If
enough major emitters make systemic changes then there should
be some measurable mitigation effect. In contrast to individuals
who are constrained in large part by what the market makes
available to them, corporate entities have the capacity on a large
and influential scale to reinvent their products and services to

81. FRANKLIN NUTTER, REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING: PART I-INSURANCE 7 (2007), available at
http://www.globalwarming.house.gov/tools/assets/files/0087.pdf.
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meet not only their economic bottom line but also a broader
82
environmental bottom line.
Bearing in mind that insurance companies deplore
“regulatory straitjackets”, this section explores how private
insurance might operate if governments issued a broad regulation
83
requiring all major greenhouse gas emitters under their
jurisdiction to carry insurance to cover climate change
catastrophe damages. In selecting which set of major greenhouse
gas emitters to regulate, the focus should be on which emitters
are most likely to continue to have a sizable cumulative impact on
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The amount of
required insurance coverage by an industry would be based on
estimated costs of future climate change disaster relief multiplied
by what percentage each emitter contributes to the national
green house gas inventory.
There are no existing products on the market that would
protect the public’s interest in disaster relief or infrastructure.
The insurance products on the market that are not targeted
specifically at climate change risks may not cover climate change
disaster. Insurers may refuse to pay claims where a policy
contains pollution exclusion and where greenhouse gases are
84
accepted as pollution. Many insurance policies deny coverage
82. United Nations, Global Compact, The Global Compact and the United
Nations Environment Programme, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Participants
AndStakeholders/un_agencies/un_environment_programme.html (last visited
Aug. 21, 2010) (describing UNEP’s “triple bottom line” work with private sector
to improve environmental sustainability).
83. These numbers are based on EPA’s proposal to regulate retrofits and new
plants from industries emitting 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas or more.
According to EPA plants emitting 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas or more account
for 70% of the carbon dioxide in the United States. See John Broder, EPA Moves
to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Sept. 30, 2009, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/science/ earth/01epa.html. In order to be
more inclusive, the term “major greenhouse gas emitters” for mandatory
insurance coverage might be defined by regulators to include plants emitting at
least 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas or all industries who contribute through
their activities or products 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas.
84. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Greenhouse Gases
Threaten Public Health and the Environment/Science overwhelmingly shows
greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity
(Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7eb
df4d0b217978b852573590040443a/08d11a451131bca585257685005bf252!OpenD
ocument (announcing that the current concentrations of greenhouse gas in the
atmosphere represent a pollution problem).
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where a given occurrence leading to loss is found by the court to
have been intended by the corporation. Arguably, industries such
as energy companies who continue to release greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere in spite of evidence that they are
contributing to the emerging impacts of climate change, intend to
cause long-term losses.
i.

Who would be required to carry coverage and how
much coverage?

While no single corporate entity may have a sizable
greenhouse gas footprint in proportion to the atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations, certain industry sectors are
having disproportionate cumulative impacts including the
producers of electricity, iron and steel, aluminum, oil, cement,
85
lime, and pulp and paper. A State could decide who is a major
emitter for purposes of its insurance regulations either based on
tons of carbon or carbon equivalent emitted annually (raw
quantification approach) or on the percentage of carbon emitted
annually in comparison to other industries (proportionality
approach). A number of tools exist which would provide methods
for setting a baseline for identifying who qualifies as a “major”
emitter within a given greenhouse gas intensive sector. For
example, the Carbon Monitoring for Action group provides
databases of the carbon dioxide emitted by various power
companies which might be used to set a numerical baseline to
quantify which corporate entities in the electricity sector would
be required to carry insurance coverage as “major greenhouse gas
86
emitters”.
How much insurance each party is required to carry would be
the subject of negotiation between the insurance industry and
government regulators. The private insurance industry cannot
viably provide climate change catastrophe insurance without
capping liability for a given event. What caps would be set would
depend on what the insurers and the government agree represent

85. Jake Schmidt, Nate Helme, Jin Lee, & Mark Houdashelt, Sector Based
Approach to the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy Archatecture, 8 CLIMATE
POLICY 494, 498 (2008).
86. CARMA, Carbon Monitoring for Action, http://carma.org/ (last visited
Aug. 21, 2010).
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a fair economic analysis of low-probability, high-damage climate
catastrophes.
ii.

How would premiums be calculated?

Insurers could calculate initial general premium sums based
on the corporate sector’s overall contribution to national
emissions and expected financial losses resulting from predicted
climate change catastrophe such as an anomalous heat wave,
storm surge, ice storm or a series of class three plus hurricanes.
Individual premiums would be based on a risk-specific factor for
each insured party. The individual risk-specific factor might be
calculated based on a raw quantification approach (e.g. for
insurance premium purposes, if carbon is valued at X per unit, an
entity would pay a risk-specific premium for volume emitted
multiplied by X), a proportionality approach (e.g. emitting 3% of
the corporate sector’s carbon contribution would result in a
premium covering 3% of the expected damages assigned to the
corporate sector), or some combination of the two. Using any of
these approaches to calculate premiums should provide incentives
to emission producing companies to focus either individually on
cutting emissions or collectively within a sector to reducing a
given sector’s emission contribution. Currently, the consumption
of electricity is responsible for 39.5% of the anthropogenic carbon
dioxide emissions with over 80% of these emissions coming from
87
coal-fired power plants. Any reduction in the corporate sector
percentage could, if a proportionality approach is used, translate
into reduced premiums for each company in the sector.
In order to rely on historical patterns of usage and realizing
that it takes time for corporations to make behavioral changes,
initial premiums could be based on the operation and production
activities of an industrial entity over a 5 to 10 year period prior to
the implementation of the insurance. To set a baseline for an
insured parties share in the carbon economy, insurance agencies
might undertake audits of direct emissions or some combination
of direct and indirect emissions for each party. In subsequent
years, insured parties would be required to submit updated thirdparty greenhouse gas reports calculated based on parameters
87. U.S. Power Plant Carbon Emissions Zoom in 2007, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2008/2008-03-18-04.asp.
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established by the initial insurance audits.
Subsequent
premiums would depend on whether a company had increased or
decreased its carbon share in comparison to both its initial
baseline and to other national emission sectors. Calculating the
premium accurately and fairly is crucial in order to provide
tangible incentives for individual companies to cut their
emissions while also continuing to hold large-scale polluters
responsible for the harms caused by their ongoing activities.
Even leaving aside the uncertainties of climate science,
insurers, industry, and government environmental regulators are
likely to dispute what is appropriately within the gamut of an
audit designed to set a baseline and how to measure industry
performance against the baseline. For a company such as retail
leviathan Wal-Mart, should they be held responsible only for the
emissions associated with operating their chain of stores in the
U.S. e.g. shipping in Wal-mart owned trucks and operating
storefronts? Or should they also be held accountable for the
emissions of their suppliers in China who are providing goods
specifically to the U.S. market or the transport emissions by
third-party transpacific shippers who are contracted by Wal-mart
to move goods to the U.S. market? The legislature would need to
make final decisions regarding which types of emissions would be
covered by baseline audits. From a mitigation perspective, both
direct and indirect emissions associated with a product or service
should be included so as to provide a realistic footprint of a given
entities greenhouse gas intensive activities.
From the perspective of simply reducing emissions, overlap
between carbon share audits might spur multiple actors into
action to mitigate the impact of their goods or services. Since
mandatory insurance would depend on national legislation and
States may be able to effectively regulate activities of a
multinational in another State, it would be prudent from the
perspective of the State and the private insurers participating in
the mandatory insurance scheme to be as inclusive as possible in
defining the parameters of direct emissions. This would ensure
that companies’ insurance premiums and amount of coverage
reflect the reality of a carbon intensive global supply chain. In
the case of a multinational such as Wal-Mart, if the emissions
audit is restricted to its activities in the U.S., it may have a
relatively modest greenhouse gas footprint in comparison to other

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/5
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similarly sized industrial actors.
But, when the focus is
broadened to include all of its manufacturing and shipping
activities across the world, the footprint becomes noticeably
larger. From a pure carbon mitigation perspective and the
concept that a polluter must pay for the consequences of its
business decisions, it makes sense to include the manufacturing
and shipping activities as part of Wal-Mart’s corporate footprint
because the strategy of using certain overseas suppliers and
third-party shippers contributes to Wal-Mart’s overall profit base
in the U.S..
iii. Who could bring claims?
The only claimants under the proposed insurance would be
the state, federal, and municipal government agencies who are
responders in the case of a catastrophe, climate change induced
or otherwise. These government agencies are in the best position
to understand how much a given catastrophe costs a community
and would have the resources to pursue and document the losses
needed to file a third-party claim. The catastrophe risk insurers
would make single payments to the government agencies that
would either be reimbursals for first response emergency work
that the government agencies had done in response to a
catastrophe such as hazard mitigation and debris removal or for
post-disaster rehabilitation payments to restore and adapt
damaged public infrastructure such as road systems, public
buildings, bridges, public utilities, and parks. In the case of postdisaster rehabilitation payments, the insurance company would
send someone to document the extent of the losses and whether a
structure could be repaired or would need to be rebuilt.
iv. What claims may be brought?
The proposed insurance would cover claims for prospective
disaster relief expenses. Claims could not be made for damages
alleged to be from before the policy was issued. This approach
simplifies one of the recurring debates about extending climate
change responsibility retroactively to cover the actions of historic
emitters and avoids employing insurance as a form of reparation.
Daniel Farber observes that while a reparation model of
compensation has a certain moral appeal, such a model relies on
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connecting a specific damage to a specific wrongdoer and then
somehow assigning responsibility through an indeterminate
88
While the reparation approach
intergenerational approach.
satisfies the equity concerns of making the polluter pay, it raises
technical problems with attributing historical pollution since
many previous polluters have ceased to exist and the pre-1990
89
amount of emissions has been dwarfed by current emissions. A
reparation approach also raises issues of whether we can hold
parties accountable when there was conflicting knowledge and
awareness of the long-term consequences of greenhouse gas
emitting activities.
v.

Relationship to other insurance products

The mandatory insurance proposed by this paper would not
replace existing products but would provide another layer of
insurance for existing disaster relief insurance products.
Currently, there is an emerging market for state and municipal
property insurance products to protect states who have
experienced disaster losses and who might need to rely in the
future on public assistance for disaster rehabilitation. In order to
receive public assistance from FEMA, entities that have already
received historic payments for disaster losses must prove
insurance coverage “for the type of hazard that caused the
90
damage” in order to remain eligible for public funds.
vi. On what basis will claims be paid?
This paper proposes the use of an index-based approach for
triggering payments of insurance claims. This approach avoids
problems of causation that are inherent in pursuing other
liability theories such as nuisance. In the context of climate
change liability, much has been written on the difficulty of

88. Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1634 (2007).
89. Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change, 421 NATURE 892 (2003)
(scientists suggest that two-thirds of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by
the 2020s will have been emitted post-1990).
90. FEMA, Insurance Considerations for Applicants: Disaster Assistance
Fact Sheet No. 9580.3 (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.fema.gov
/government/grant/pa/9580_3.shtm.
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91

How can one reasonably trace a
causation and attribution.
particular weather event to a particular set of greenhouse gases
emitted by an identifiable defendant? Physicist Myles Allen
proposes one potential methodology for attributing damage to
anthropogenically caused climate change. He argues that even
though we cannot know with certainty how greenhouse gas
emissions alter the risks associated with events such as flooding,
it may be able to work out a “mean likelihood-weighted liability”
92
through averaging over all the possibilities. If Allen is correct
about this, we can then calculate what percentage of a given
event is attributable to climate change factors. If it is possible to
assign a climate change attribution rate to any given event, then
all that is needed to assign costs for damages in a nationally
equitably way is the collective carbon share of all insured parties
and the national carbon share for each insured party at the time
of an event covered by the insurance policy.
But Allen’s probability and percentage approach could prove
very complicated and would leave ample space for interminable
legal and scientific wrangling about whether an event was
actually caused by anthropogenic climate change.
Instead,
insurers could decide in concert with independent climate
experts, who are not employed by the government, what
measurable environmental triggers should result in the
government’s ability to file a claim. For example, heat waves of a
certain temperature and duration in a particular location that
result in damages and a government disaster response might
trigger a claim. Or windstorms of a certain velocity that result in
damages and a government disaster response might trigger a
claim. This approach would enhance the objectivity of the claim
process and would lend a degree of predictability to both paying
damages and recovering damages under the insurance policy.
The use of triggers for insurance products is already common
for certain types of index insurance such as weather based crop
insurance schemes.
These products look at one or more

91. Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change,
Insurability Of Large- Scale Disasters, And The Emerging Liability Challenge,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2007); Roda Verheyen , CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); David A. Grossman, Warming up to a not so radical
idea: Tort-based climate change litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003).
92. Allen, supra note 89, at 891.

31

TELESETSKY

722

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

measurable parameters such as temperature or precipitation
which is considered responsible for most crop losses. In the case
of these products, insurers give payouts even where there is no
damage claimed. Development organizations such as the World
Bank are currently popularizing index-based insurance to help
small-scale farmers in Malawi, India, and Thailand cope with
93
droughts and floods attributable to severe weather. Some of the
strengths of trigger-based insurance products over other
insurance products are the transparency of the trigger-based
system, the objectivity and relative speed of the claims process,
and the ability of insurers to more accurately calculate their
losses when a trigger event occurs.
Even though claims payments on the part of the insurer for
an index insurance product would simply be an objective exercise,
setting what parameters would trigger the insurance would be a
highly subjective exercise given what is known and not known
about attribution and climate change. Creating reasonable
climate change attribution triggers requires a careful refinement
of climate models coupled with eventual judgment calls by
scientists and policymakers. Once a trigger is set, the triggerbased insurance approach will avoid a constant battle of experts
over each claim. If the standards to set triggers are easily
verifiable, whether a given trigger has been activated should be
easily ascertainable for government claimants.
Without
requiring any formal finding by an expert or a judiciary, the
events that trigger insurance claims would be considered, for
purposes of insurance payouts, climate change attributable
events.
Setting appropriate triggers is likely to be primarily a
scientific endeavor coupled with an economic judgment call.
Arguably the insurance industry could set triggers that are
unreasonably high such as 10-day heat waves of 100 plus in
Anchorage, Alaska. While setting the triggers at this level would
result in low premiums, which may be favored by the insured
companies, it would provide no financial incentive for
undertaking any short or long-term emission mitigation or other
loss prevention measures. At the other extreme, setting the

93. Xavier Gine, The World Bank, The Promise of Index Insurance, THE
WORLD BANK (Mar. 2009), http://go.worldbank.org/FN5UCVPJG0.
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triggers too low would potentially result in multiple payments by
insurers, exorbitantly high premiums, and a higher likelihood of
insolvency on the part of both insurers and insured companies.
Some balance would be necessary if insurance is to serve any role
in reducing emissions and ensuring that the polluter pays some of
the expenses associated with government disaster response
through their required insurance payments.
One possible, albeit controversial, trigger for climate change
index insurance could be parts per million of carbon or carbon
equivalents in the atmosphere. How much carbon is too much is
heavily disputed. Some groups argue that we have passed the
last “safe” level of 350 ppm. Others suggest that the point of no
94
return is 450 ppm.
Perhaps regulators in cooperation with
insurance companies could set a trigger somewhere in between
and use this number as a basis for calculating insurance risk and
appropriate premiums.
vii. Collecting on claims
How would the government be able to collect disaster
payments to reimburse for government expenses?
For
illustration purposes, take the following hypothetical case. A
heat wave hits New York with temperatures in excess of 115
degrees Fahrenheit over the course of five days. It results in the
city of New York declaring a disaster and delivering $10,000,000
dollars of services. According to the insurance policy, heat waves
of greater than 105 degrees in the New York metropolitan area
that last for more than two days and that result in government
responses would trigger claims.
Once the government
demonstrates that the trigger elements in the policy have
occurred, the insurer would pay the claim for losses and damages
attributed to the trigger elements, such as costs of acquiring
water from another water district or the costs of bringing in
additional emergency medical services.
Since not all of the emissions responsible for the temperature
spike would be the responsibility of major greenhouse gas
emitters who are under the jurisdiction of the insurance scheme,
94. Green, A Blog About Energy & the Environment, N. Y. TIMES, The
Climate Change Numbers Game, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/
carbon-concentrations-already-too-much/ (June 4, 2009, 11:32 EST).
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the insured parties would only be responsible for some proportion
of the losses. In the heatwave hypothetical, if 80% of the New
York heat wave triggering emissions were assigned to the major
greenhouse gas emitters, all insurees would be collectively
responsible for $8,000,000.
Because each insuree would only be held accountable for a
proportional amount of the damages associated with a particular
event, the proportion of damages collected would depend on the
emissions record of each insured party. If power company A has
made a concerted effort to reduce its emissions by using
alternative less polluting fuels and power company B has
continued to use coal-generation power plant technology, the
contribution from power company B to climate disaster damages
would be substantially more than power company A.
As
premiums climb for late-adopters of climate friendly practices,
the insurance market will need to demand either a schedule of
emission reductions or larger premiums to cover insurers’ risks.
As premiums grow larger and more costs are passed on to
consumers, large recalcitrant greenhouse gas emitters may
become less competitive as consumers seek alternative products
and services.
viii. Reinsurance
The viability of a mandatory catastrophe risk insurance
product depends in part on the availability of reinsurance
markets to insure the risk portfolios of insurance companies.
Like other insurance products, this proposed product would need
to have some upper limit on payouts to protect private insurance
and reinsurance companies from bankruptcy. Once the policy
limit for a particular event is exceeded, the government would, as
in the case of Japanese earthquake insurance, be the ultimate
social reinsurer by paying for the bulk of certain extraordinary
claims.
5.

Climate change equity and the advantages and
disadvantages of using mandatory insurance as a
mitigation strategy

The intent behind the proposed third-party climate change
catastrophe insurance product is two fold: recoup some amount of

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/5
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government costs for disaster relief in the case of a low
probability high damage disaster, and provide financial
incentives for industries to change current business practices so
as to reduce the future probabilities of climate related disasters.
The success of this type of insurance scheme to promote
climate change mitigation depends on insurers accurately setting
base premiums that would cover their projected losses in the
event of a climate change catastrophe.
If the insurance
premiums become simply another minor business expense, it will
have little influence on promoting behaviors that will result in
measurable emission reductions and may expose insurers to
insolvency in the case of a claim that cannot be paid out of the
collected premiums.
In addition to addressing the distributive justice issue of who
should pay for long-term damage, the catastrophe risk insurance
policies have the potential to also be used to address larger equity
issues between currently industrialized states and states that
have neither benefited from nor contributed to the carbon
economy. Depending on how it structures its regulations, a
government may be able to seek reimbursals from industries for
government payments into global insurance pools for states with
low adaptive capacity, such as the Pacific Island states or
Bangladesh, or to global climate funds such as the $3.5 billion of
funds pledged at the 2009 Copenhagen conference to prevent
95
tropical forest destruction and degradation. This would not only
result in an implementation of the polluter pays principle
discussed below but would also satisfy the goals of distributive
justice by transferring wealth to those communities where the
global carbon economy has unfairly exposed individuals to
human-created conditions of vulnerability.
The advantage of creating a new insurance product is that it
provides a fast-track approach for greenhouse gas mitigation with
key roles for non-political, business-oriented agents to ensure
compliance with insurer-insuree negotiated mitigation targets.
In fact, before such a mandatory insurance system would go into
effect, insurance companies, seeking to manage their potential

95. Juliet Ellperin, Hope and Funding for Saving Forests Around the World,
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/12/19/AR2009121902262.html?hpid=topnews#.
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losses, might demand easy-to-implement risk loss measures from
their insured parties (e.g. energy efficiency measures or
investments in emission reducing production practices). In order
to reduce initial premiums, companies may voluntarily undertake
emission reduction measures before requesting a coverage policy.
This mandatory insurance proposal avoids the problems
faced in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez disaster. The U.S.
endeavored to make Exxon internalize the costs of its dangerous
activities by requiring Exxon to pay for the cleanup and
restoration of the environment. The result was a “dilatory and
96
inadequate response.”
Here the Valdez problem is avoided
because the large carbon emitters internalize the future costs of
delivering emergency services before a potential disaster through
the payment of annual premiums.
Because certain corporate entities are being targeted for
participation in the program, certain equal protection issues
emerge.
Any mandatory insurance system has to have
parameters whereby some companies are held financially
accountable while others are spared. In an ideal world of
textbook equity, all corporate entities regardless of quantity of
emissions, would be required to undertake climate-proofing of
their activities and to indemnify the government in the event of a
climate change induced catastrophe. This approach is, however,
not feasible since the transaction costs associated with
establishing a nationwide comprehensive program would be far
greater than the benefits accrued from requiring a single
restaurant owner to reduce deliveries or a small business
consultant to eliminate all travel.
In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed insurance system, two sets of questions emerge. The
first set of questions address industry-to-industry relations. Will
implementation of this insurance policy cause one set of
industries to ultimately bear the responsibility for climate change
that should be more broadly shared by other industries? For
example, should the electricity industry have to bear the largest
burden because its direct products and service are greenhouse gas
intensive while other companies such as car manufacturers are

96. PATRICIA BIRNIE &
ENVIRONMENT 93 (2002).
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only being held accountable for their direct production emissions
and not for the indirect emissions resulting from consumers?
Should car companies be held accountable for some additional
share of emissions because they have demonstrated the capacity
to produce low-emission vehicles and yet continue to manufacture
fossil fuel driven vehicles to meet what they perceive as consumer
demand?
The second set of questions addresses the relationship
between industry and consumers. Where a business is faced with
new regulations and expenses, it frequently passes some portion
of the costs onto consumers. In the context of climate change
damages, it is arguably fair that automobile drivers, energy
users, airline passengers, and other consumers of greenhouse gasintensive products and services pay for the privileges of
participating in the carbon economy. After all, as discussed
above, the polluter should pay for harm caused by their choice of
activities. But is it fair to allow corporations to pass on all of
their costs to consumers when consumers have little to no
influence over the design of the cars available on the market?
How can our legal system truly hold a corporate actor responsible
as a polluter without triggering a ripple effect of responsibility
that ultimately ends up in consumers funding a company’s
expenses through the future price of goods and services?
These are the dilemmas that will surface when trying to
define specific rules for an insurance approach that combines
carbon mitigation with long-term accountability. The focus on
the relationship between climate change and insurance should be
on these sorts of questions rather than the currently debated
question of whether climate change as a phenomenon is
insurable. Requiring mandatory catastrophe risk insurance for
high emitters is not a silver bullet solution. Yet requiring
companies to take a hard look at their emissions in the context of
risk management for disaster relief may serve as an important
step in the stimulation of rapid mitigation efforts on the part of
major emitters.
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PART TWO:
MANDATORY INSURANCE AS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
ASPECTS OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE
This second part of the paper argues that the mandatory
insurance scheme described above promotes a viable approach to
implementing the Polluter Pays Principle as an equity concept
that satisfies the goals of both corrective justice and distributive
justice. Insurance explicitly allocates responsibility.
The polluter pays principle (PPP) seems rudimentary in
concept. Parties are held accountable to compensate injured
parties for the costs of the damage that they have caused or are
likely to cause given the hazardous nature of a particular activity.
In practice, PPP remains under-implemented especially for
problems with a global reach. One reason for the inequitable
implementation of the principle is the split nature of the concept.
In legal debates, PPP is cited as both a general principle of equity
97
as well as a principle of economic efficiency. This dual nature of
PPP has in practice led to it being considered primarily as an
efficiency principle and only secondarily as an aspirational legal
principle.
Because its first articulation as a principle was at the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
as a methodology for internalizing costs of pollution abatement,
PPP is considered primarily an economic concept for efficiently
98
sharing damages. It described PPP as “the principle to be used
for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures
to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and
99
to avoid distortions in international trade and investment.” The
goal for the principle was “to ensure that the environment is in an
100
acceptable state.”

97. See generally NICOLAS SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM
POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 23-32 (2000).
98. ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, No. C(72)
128, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS: GUIDING PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES annex para.
(A)(a)(4) (1972).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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The OECD eventually adopted a broader interpretation of
PPP as a liability concept and not simply as a cost allocation
101
principle. The idea of PPP was interpreted by the secretariat of
the International Law Commission as an extension of civil
102
liability concepts.
In recent OECD documents, staff indicate
that “environmental liability is an important instrument of
implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle” and that PPP
103
should have “deterrent effects.”
In analyzing the dual economic and liability paradigms of the
concept, Hans Christian Bugge describes PPP as an
environmental economics principle which promotes the “efficiency
principle of internalization of environmental costs” as well as a
legal principle which promotes “liability and compensation for
104
environmental damage.”
While fusing law with economics has
emerged as an influential theoretical approach, treating PPP as
both an economic and a legal principle has failed to effectively
promote justice or create justice-generating norms. In fact the
fused approach of PPP as a law and economic principle has led in
part to PPP being the source of “doubts and criticism in economic
105
theory as well as in politics.”
Instead of attempting to negotiate a dual economic and legal
approach to PPP, PPP as applied to global problems should focus
on the principles of equity and fairness rather than as a means of

101. Sanford Gaines, The Polluters Pays Principle from Economic Equity to
Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L. J. 463 (1991).
102. Int’l Law Commission, Survey on liability regimes relevant to the topic
International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not
prohibited by international law: study prepared by the Secretariat, 84, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/471 (1995).
103. Task Force for the Implementation of the Environmental Action
Programme for Central and Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia,
OECD ENV/EPOC/EAP/REPIN 1 (2009); cf. Environmental Liability to Natural
Resources in OECD Countries: The Concept and Key Approaches,
ENV/EPOC/EAP/REPIN 3, 13 (2009); cf. Jean-Philippe Barde, Economic

Instruments in Environmental Policy: Lessons from the OECD Experience and
their Relevance to Developing Economies OCDE/GE/(93)(193) 31 (Working
Paper No. 92, 1994), (stating unequivocally that the PPP is not a liability
principle concerned with who is responsible for pollution but only determining
at what level environmental costs should be internalized.).
104. Hans Christian Bugge, The Polluter Pays Principle: Dilemmas of Justice
in National and International Contexts, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN
CONTEXT 411 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009).
105. Id. at 412.
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efficiently distributing loss.
Given industry’s increasing
knowledge of the social costs of industrial pollution coupled with
industry’s refusal to take responsibility in areas such as
hazardous waste disposal (the shipping of hazardous waste such
as electronic waste from North American dumps to overseas
dumps in developing countries) and large natural resource
extraction, the legal aspects of PPP should be deemed to trump
any application of the economic components of the principle.
Fairness and equity may not always result in efficient results.
In its purest legal form, PPP is a doctrine that when applied
in a global context could exemplify the goals of corrective
106
justice. It rectifies wrongs and endeavors to make parties whole
even when it requires substantial and inefficient economic
sacrifices from a polluter. Applying it in its purest form, PPP
provides relief for not only economic damages but also social costs
and environmental costs. It can correct systemic discrimination
by holding parties accountable for both the intended and
unintended consequences of their actions.
In spite of the evolution of PPP into a liability concept, PPP
has only been rarely applied as a remedy for distributive or
107
corrective justice. While the principle is widely recognized, PPP
has not played a particularly robust role in legal theory given its
treatment in negotiations as a relatively amorphous principle.
After its debut at the OECD as a named principle, PPP has
appeared in numerous international documents starting with the
1986 Single European Act, designed to unify and liberalize

106. Id. at 420 (describing how holding a person responsible for pollution
damages regardless of fault under a PPP analysis would support “a clear
principle corrective justice.”).
107. See Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) Supp 5 SCR
241. In this case, an environmental citizen group sued the government to
demand regulation of tanneries in Tamil Nadu who were discharging large
quantities of untreated effluent into agricultural fields and public waterways
resulting in 35,000 hectares of land damage and water contamination. The
Court ordered the government to establish an environmental authority to deal
with Tamil Nadu’s polluting industries, to identify local victims of pollution, and
to seek compensation which would reverse environmental damage. Polluters
who refused to pay whole compensation would be shut down and compensation
for victims would be recovered from the sale of polluters’ assets. In shutting
down non-responsive polluters, the Supreme Court of India made a decisive
move to pursue the equities of remedying pollution damages over the efficiencies
of economic development and cost allocation.
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108

The EU nations committed themselves so
European markets.
that “action by the Community relating to the environment shall
be based on principles that preventive action should be taken,
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
109
the source, and that the polluter should pay.” No definition was
offered for what constitutes “action by the Community relating to
the environment” or how to ensure that the polluter pays for
environmental damage.
PPP was also included in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development but in an equally vague fashion.
The Rio representatives conceived of PPP as an emerging
principle of international law and described it in the tepid
language of Principle 16 where governments agreed to “endeavor
to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that
the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with
due regard to the public interest and without distorting
110
international trade and investment.”
The choice emasculates
PPP as a legal principle providing only that “in principle” parties
should “endeavor” to take certain actions.
Yet in spite of the lack of specificity of what an international
application of PPP requires from the polluter and from an
oversight agency, there is a prevailing theme in most of the
treaties and other international environmental documents where
PPP appears, that the application of this principle is grounded in
equity, fairness, and accountability rather than merely in
111
economic efficiency.

108. 1986 Single European Act, art.130r(2), (Feb. 17, 1986), Official Journal of
the European Communities, No. L. 169/11.
109. Id.
110. U.N. Dep’t of Econ & Soc Affairs [DESA], Report of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Annex 1, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, August 12, 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug.
12, 1992).
111. See, e.g., Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of The Northeast Pacific,
Feb. 18 2002; Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused
by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters
to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, May 21, 2003; Convention on
civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment,
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In order to address the social challenges inherent in climate
change, insurance makes sense as a fair accountability
mechanism because it contributes to an ex ante solution.
Insurance has an important role in managing risk up front rather
than analyzing risky behavior after the fact as in an ordinary
liability context. This ex ante versus ex post approach to risk
management has the potential to secure some changes in
mitigating emissions in the short-term rather than waiting for
long-term consequences of climate change and then apportioning
of liability.
In addition, insurance has the possibility of
contributing to new risk management practices that may
eventually decelerate the pace of climate change. Insurers can
create the conditions for needed emission reductions by assigning
high premiums to major emitters. High premiums may stimulate
innovation or new policies in corporate energy use, methane
capture, or low carbon delivery of goods and services.
Purists may argue that insurance that has policy caps can
never satisfy PPP because polluters under any given claim would
only cover a portion of incurred damages. If the government
incurs costs, the polluter will not have paid. But nothing in the
principle indicates that the polluter pays all. As far as the goals
of distributive justice are concerned, mandatory insurance
ensures that key polluters contribute fairly to public disaster
services thereby redistributing the current financial burden on
the government. As far as the goals of corrective justice are
concerned, insurance ensures that polluters are held at least
partially accountable for the environmental consequences of their
business decisions.
CONCLUSION
Presently, the insurance industry is watching the ongoing
climate change negotiations carefully in order to understand how
it might impact existing property and casualty policies. This
proposal comes at an important time in the U.S. given the
ongoing congressional discussions regarding whether federal
reinsurance should be made available to cover state catastrophe
funds. Florida Democrat Ron Klein argues that 100% taxpayer
June 21, 1993; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992.
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funded reinsurance is necessary to ensure that states can respond
112
to new climate change pressures.
The proposal in this paper for mandatory third-party
catastrophe risk insurance would more equitably distribute the
costs of climate change between the government as the “ultimate
reinsurer” and major greenhouse gas emitters who have benefited
from maintaining the status quo greenhouse gas intensive
economy. Unlike the current bills proposed in Congress to
federally backstop state catastrophe funds, this paper’s proposal
for mandatory insurance ensures a major role for the private
113
insurance industry
as not just a risk manager but more
importantly as an unparalleled source of private governance with
a financial incentive to ensure timely mitigation of existing
climate catastrophe risks. The proposed insurance would benefit
from early adoption by nations to bolster efforts of disaster relief
agencies to prepare for the improbable but not impossible events
114
predicted by scientists.
Much has been written and said about corporate social
responsibility in the past decades.
Mandatory corporate
insurance provides industries with the opportunity to
demonstrate their social responsibility. The product requires
insurance industries to follow Lloyds of London’s directive to its
insurers to go out and “engage with the wider world through

112. Dipka Bhambhani, Federal Insurance Considered for Climate Change
Disasters, CLEAN SKIES, Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.cleanskies.com/articles/
lawmakers-consider-federal-disaster-insurance-amid-threat-climate-changedisasters.
113. American Insurance Association is currently opposing the Homeowners
Defense Act designed to provide federal reinsurance for state catastrophe funds.
As their spokesperson observed, “[a]lthough well-intended, H.R. 2555 will not
generate new private sector insurance, reinsurance or capital market capacity.
Instead, it is more likely to encourage the development of state programs that
will displace the private market and require a federal government bailout in the
event of a catastrophe.” House Panel Face Environmental, Insurer Groups over
Catastrophe Bill, INS. J., Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2010/03/10/108014.htm.
114. Matthew Moore, Copenhagen Climate Summit: Global Warming Disaster
Predictions, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/
copenhagen-climate-changeconfe/6726226/Copenhagen-climate-change-summitthe-key-countries-and-what-they-want-us.html (predicting that an increase of 2
degrees Celsius cause acidification that will devastate shellfish stocks, 20 to
30% food and water shortages in Asia, 20 to 30% loss of biodiversity, and more
damaging extreme weather events).
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The
meaningful, tangible partnerships to mitigate risk.“
product requires major greenhouse gas emitters to accept
accountability and ensure that greenhouse gas mitigation is a
core function of their activities. Leaving aside all of the details of
how best to implement the product, the concept behind insuring
the public at large against catastrophic climate events is simple:
those who profit the most from the greenhouse gas intensive
markets will pay until they innovate.

115. Lloyds of London, supra note 1, at 13.
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